INTRODUCTION

Biofuels are attracting increasing interest around the world. Governments have announced strong commitments to biofuel programs as a way to both reduce greenhouse gas emissions and diversify energy sources. Advocates of biofuel subsidies and mandates frequently cite Brazil´s experience with sugar cane-based biomass ethanol as a success story and model for increasing energy security. Today, Brazil is the world’s largest biofuel market and Brazilian ethanol from sugarcane is arguably the first renewable fuel to be cost-competitive with a petroleum fuel for transport. The United States, where most ethanol is produced from corn, is the second largest biofuel market.
These two countries share some important characteristics. Geographically, both have continental dimensions. Both have great agricultural capabilities and well-developed domestic automobile industries. In absolute terms, the Brazilian and U.S. fuel ethanol markets are comparable in size. In 2005, Brazil produced 4,227 million gallons of ethanol; the United States produced 4,264 million gallons[1]. However, in biofuels’ market share, the difference is striking. In the United States, ethanol supplied only 3 percent of total motor fuel consumed in 2005, while in Brazil, ethanol supplied 40 percent[2].
One reason for this difference is simply the larger overall size of the U.S. motor fuel market, due to the greater number of cars in the United States. In Brazil, there are 23 million vehicles and 49.1 million households, an average of 0.47 vehicles per household. In the United States, there are 204 million vehicles for 107 million U.S. households, an average of 1.9 vehicle per household[3]. Cultural attachment to the automobile is also different in each country. Unlike in the United States, in Brazil, cars with small motors of up to 1.4 liters dominate the market.
Ethanol production is also more economical in Brazil than in the United States. This is due to several factors, including the superiority of sugarcane to corn as an ethanol feedstock, Brazil’s large unskilled labor force (sugarcane production is very labor intensive), and a climate ideally suited to growing sugarcane. While the U.S. and Brazil make about the same volume of ethanol, the U.S. uses almost twice as much land to cultivate corn for ethanol as Brazil does to cultivate sugarcane for the same purpose.
Given these advantages, the productivity and efficiency of the Brazilian sugarcane ethanol production are virtually unmatched by any other country. So it is far from clear that the United States can or should attempt to replicate Brazil’s biofuel policies or achievements.
One objective of this paper is to review the factors that have contributed to the success of the Brazilian bioethanol industry. The evolution of this industry offers some valuable lessons for other countries considering ethanol production. The paper will show that even in Brazil, where climate and labor market conditions favor ethanol production, ethanol is cost-competitive with gasoline only during periods when oil prices are high. For the United States, it seems implausible for ethanol production to have a significant impact on the market for oil, helping reduce America´s dependence on petroleum.

1. A Brief History of Brazil´s Ethanol Program

Brazil’s National Alcohol Program, PROALCOOL, was launched in 1975 as a policy to reduce the country’s dependence on oil imports. At the time, Brazil was importing 80 percent of its oil and the 1973 OPEC oil embargo and production cutback had raised concerns that oil dependency could endanger national security[4].
PROALCOOL was both an energy security program and an agricultural price support program. It aimed to increase production of sugarcane alcohol for use as a gasoline substitute, but it also sought to guarantee the profitability of the sugar industry after the sharp fall in sugar prices in 1974. The program allowed the excess production to be converted into alcohol (ethanol) in special distilleries close to the sugar mill. The ethanol thus produced would be blend with gasoline in a proportion of up to 24 percent.
As a first step, PROALCOOL aimed to increase the number of distilleries in the existing mills with the federal government offering extremely attractive credit guarantees and low-interest loans for construction of new refineries. These initial incentives accounted for nearly $2 billion in loans (nominal dollars) which represented 29 percent of the total investment needed[5]. The principal beneficiaries of the credit programs were the large producers[6].
Next, the government began using the state oil company PETROBRAS to make infrastructure investments for ethanol distribution and to keep the cost of ethanol to consumers significantly cheaper than the cost of gasoline. The distribution of ethanol by PETROBRAS was based on a cross-subsidy scheme whereby gasoline prices were artificially boosted to keep the price of ethanol at a competitive level. Through its involvement in the National Alcohol Program, PETROBRAS accumulated losses of around $4 billion[7].
These incentives were key to the rapid expansion of ethanol consumption in Brazil. In less than four years, ethanol production more than tripled[8].
When the Iranian Revolution triggered a second oil crisis in 1979, the Brazilian government expanded PROALCOOL to promote the production of vehicles especially designed for ethanol use. In the early 1980s, it signed agreements with major automobile manufacturers—including Fiat, Volkswagen, Mercedes Benz, General Motors, and Toyota—to increase the production of ethanol-fueled vehicles. Taxi drivers were given tax breaks to convert their car engines to run on 100 percent ethanol, and the government mandated the use of ethanol-fueled vehicles in its own fleet. As a result, between 1983 and 1988, ethanol-fueled cars accounted for over 90 percent of total auto sales. In 1984, ethanol-powered cars accounted for 94.4 percent of automobile production for the Brazilian market[9].
During the second half of 1980s, however, Brazil’s ethanol program began to experience problems. Huge fiscal deficits and high inflation led Brazil to start economic reforms that included a cutback on ethanol production subsidies. At the same time, world oil prices dropped sharply during 1985-1986, obviating the consumer benefit of replacing oil with ethanol. The economics became even more unfavorable in 1988 when the world sugar price rose considerably, and, at the same time, the government liberalized the sugar export market. As a result, sugarcane planters diverted crops to the sugar export market, leading to a severe ethanol shortage during the second quarter of 1989. In response, the government authorized ethanol imports, and, ironically, Brazil turned into a net importer of ethanol. Drivers stopped buying ethanol-fueled cars, and car manufacturers stopped producing them. By the mid-1990s, only taxis and rental cars were being produced to run on ethanol[10].

PROALCOOL First Incentives

* Guaranteed alcohol price lower than gasoline price
* Guaranteed remuneration to the producer
* Loans for alcohol producers to increase their capacity
* Tax reduction for alcohol cars
* Mandatory alcohol selling in Gas stations
* Maintenance of strategic alcohol stocks

During the 1990s, the Brazilian economy experienced profound transformation. Economic policy emphasized stabilization, privatization, and liberalization—priorities into which an industrial policy program like PROALCOOL did not fit. There was little political support for continued taxpayer-funded subsidies for sugar growers or distillers. The government gradually rescinded PROALCOOL’s incentives and subsidies and freed alcohol prices to fluctuate with the market. Nevertheless, throughout this period, the federal government continued to require that all gasoline sold in Brazil contain roughly 20 percent ethanol. The government’s rationale was environmental—ethanol would reduce emissions of lead and other pollutants. This helped sustain the industry through hard times.
An official evaluation of the total amount of investments in both the agricultural and industrial sectors for the production of ethanol for automotive use found that during 1975-1989 the government had spent a total of $12.3 billion in the National Alcohol Program[11].
Towards the end of 1990’s, some Brazilian engineers and policy makers sought to revive the ethanol fuel program. Ford launched its first flex-fuel prototype in 2002, with Volkswagen following in 2003. Flex-fuel cars able to run on ethanol, gasoline, or any mixture of the two caught on quickly. By March 2004, flex-fuel vehicles represented 16 percent of new cars sold in Brazil. By February 2006, the figure was 73 percent. (See Figure 1). The success of flex-fuel cars has led some automakers to announce plans to extend the technology for the production of all light vehicles in Brazil.











FIGURE1
Source: Anfavea, 2006

2. Ethanol in Brazil Today
The dramatic increase in flex-fuel vehicles has helped fuel the Brazlian sugarcane industry’s recent expansion. Today, Brazil is the world’s biggest sugar producer and exporter, and the world’s largest producer and consumer of sugarcane ethanol as a transportation fuel. In 2006, Brazil produced 4.2 billion gallons of ethanol. About 85 percent of the domestic production is concentrated in the Center South of the country and more than half of it is located in the state of São Paulo[12].

About 80 percent of the country's total ethanol production is for domestic consumption, but exports have been growing for several years. By 2010, Brazilian companies are expected to invest about $10 billion in dozens of new sugar mills to boost ethanol production, while aiming to double exports.
In Brazil, sugar and ethanol are produced on an integrated basis. Currently, there are 306 operational mills producing 55 million tons of sugar or ethanol. The option to produce more or less of each product is influenced by the relative prices. When sugar prices increase, for example, producers can divert sugarcane production from ethanol to sugar. The production process also generates 100 million tons of waste—bagasse and straw— that can be used as fuel for heat and power generation. This is one significant advantage of sugarcane-based ethanol. Today, Brazilian mills and distilleries are nearly entirely self-sufficient in energy supply, and a few even sell surplus electricity.
Another advantage of sugarcane is its highly favorable energetic balance when compared with other ethanol sources. Under conditions in Brazil, sugarcane’s productivity is roughly twice that of corn-based ethanol. As long as raw material accounts for roughly 60 percent of production costs, the comparative advantages of sugarcane is crucial to Brazilian ethanol’s commercial feasibility. It is also worth noting that almost all sugarcane production, which is water-intensive, grows in rain-fed cultivated areas. Brazilian scientists have produced cane varieties that are genetically resistant to the main crop diseases. There are more than 500 commercial varieties of cane, of which 20 varieties are used in 80 percent of the cane area[13].

Production costs for ethanol in Brazil are the world´s lowest. The average production cost is approximately $ 0.75 per gallon, according to UNICA, the industry association. Factors contributing to Brazil’s competitiveness include favorable climate conditions, low labor, costs and mature infrastructure built over at least three decades. As Figure 3 shows, productivity gains have been substantial. Between 1975 and 2000, modernization of the sugarcane yield per hectare increased by 33 percent and ethanol yield from sugar rose by 14 percent. If ethanol could also be produced efficiently from cane bagasse, a process that is under development in Brazil, future productivity increases could be even greater[14]. These efficiency gain achieved over a three-decade “learning curve,” combined with the aforementioned factors unique to the country, allow Brazil to sell ethanol close to or below the market price of gasoline.

Unlike the Brazilian Alcohol Program’s early days, today the Brazilian sugar program does not rely on any governmental price support mechanism. There are currently no production subsidies and no indirect costs paid by other sectors. The government’s main intervention is the aforementioned requirement for all gasoline sold to contain a minimum percentage of ethanol. This is partly due to environmental rather than economic concerns. The introduction of ethanol as a substitute for lead additives has helped improve air quality in large cities, particularly São Paulo.
As ethanol provides fewer miles per gallon than gasoline, Brazilian drivers know that ethanol is price competitive only when it costs no more than 70 percent of the price of gasoline. In March 2006, the blending ratio was reduced from 25 percent to 20 percent after ethanol prices soared to all-time highs. Brazillian drivers stopped using pure ethanol as the price reached $ 0.90, about 85 precent of the price of gasoline. Since both sugar ethanol and oil prices remain volatile, analysts diverge about the trajectory of ethanol as a fuel in Brazil. The beginning of the sugarcane crop season turned ethanol cost competitive with gasoline, at least in the regions near the production areas. In the North and Northeast of Brazil, high transportation costs still limit the economic viability of using ethanol as fuel.
Ethanol, gasoline and the consumer choice in two major cities in Brazil

São Paulo Rio de Janeiro

Ethanol price = US$ 2.70 Ethanol price = US$ 3.30
Gasoline price (E20) = US$ 4.20 Gasoline price (E20) = US$ 4.40

Currently, ethanol price is 64 percent of the price of gasoline in São Paulo and 75 percent in Rio de Janeiro. Ethanol is not cost competitive with gasoline in this latter. Price instability is still a problem to be faced, even near production areas like São Paulo.

At the prevailing exchange rate of U$1 = R$2.15, average price of gasoline (E20) in São Paulo was US$4.20 per gallon while ethanol was US$ 2.70. At these prices Brazilian drivers still benefit using ethanol. In Rio de Janeiro, to use gasoline is still more economical than ethanol.[m1]

Brazil: World’s Lowest-cost Sugar Producer – Summary of Advantages

Favorable climate, abundance of land, fertile, and plentiful rainfall in Center-South

Production areas near the major consumption centers.

Use of bagasse for plant energy use and surplus electricity sales

Between 1975-2000, sugarcane yield per hectare increased by 33 percent, sugar content of cane 8 percent, ethanol yield from sugar 14 percent, and fermentation productivity 150 percent

More than 500 commercial varieties of cane (each plant processes around 15 varieties)

Hybrid sugar mill/distillery complexes

Planting, harvesting, and plant operations computerized.

3. Concluding remarks and some lessons from Brazil
Given Brazil’s natural and acquired advantages for ethanol production, it is difficult to imagine the United States matching Brazil’s level of ethanol consumption—40 percent of the motor fuel market—at a reasonable economic cost. In the U.S., corn-based ethanol would be viable only if it were to compete in the market on the same basis as other fuels. American taxpayers today pay twice for ethanol: once in crop subsidies to corn farmers and again in a 51-cent subsidy for every gallon of ethanol. Without such a subsidy, ethanol simply wouldn't be cost competitive with gasoline.
Corn based ethanol produced in quantities large enough to displace a significant percentage of U.S. petroleum consumption could have significant environmental impacts. According to the Worldwatch Institute[15], ethanol may damage the environment as much as fossil fuels when it is produced on a large scale from low-yielding crops such as corn. In these cases it may generate as much or more greenhouse gas emissions than do petroleum fuels.
A point rarely noted in discussions of the Brazilian biofuel program is that, along with ethanol, oil self-sufficiency has been a long-term goal of the Brazilian government. After the crisis with PROALCOOL during the late 1980s, the Brazilian government, through PETROBRAS, has put much more emphasis on increasing oil production. Based on its excellent performance on offshore exploration, PETROBRAS increased oil production by an average of 9 percent per year since 1980, in the range of 1.8 million barrels per day. In 2006, Brazil achieved self-sufficiency in oil and expects to export an estimated 500,000 bpd by 2010.
If ethanol was truly key in displacing oil imports, the Brazilian ethanol program also shows that biofuels should not be considered a panacea for the world’s energy challenges. Brazil’s ethanol infrastructure model required huge taxpayer subsidies over decades before it could become viable. The ethanol program became uneconomical when petroleum prices fell in the late 1990s. Even today, during a period of high oil prices, ethanol volatile prices have not freed Brazilians from losing money on the E20 blend mandated by their government. The Brazilian ethanol program is not a suitable model for U.S. energy policy reform.

About the Author

Marcus Renato S. Xavier is an economist at the Federation of Industries of the State of Minas Gerais and Professor of Economics at IBMEC Business School and Fundação João Pinheiro and Senior Fellow of Instituto Liberdade. He received his B.A in Economics from Federal University of Minas Gerais and his Master degree from University of São Paulo. He is also a senior fellow from Instituto Liberdade.

The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely responsibility of the author and should not be attributed in any manner to those organizations
[1] F.O. Licht Database 2006 <http://www.agra-net.com/portal/>
[2] Masami Kojima and Todd Johnson. Potential for Biofuel for Transport in Developing Countries. Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme. World Bank, October 2005. Pg. 1.
[3] Leslie Miller. Cars, trucks now outnumber drivers. Salon. 29 August 2003. http://www.salon.com/tech/wire/2003/08/29/cars_and_drivers/index.html
[4] Petrobras (Petróleo Brasileiro S.A) 2006. Data from http://www.petrobras.com.br/.
[5] J. R. Moreira and J.Goldemberg. The Alcohol Program. Energy Policy 27 (1999) 229-245. Pg. 232
[6] Masami Kojima and Todd Johnson. Op cit. Pg. 48.
[7] J. R. Moreira and J.Goldemberg. Op. cit. Pg. 235.
[8] Jaime Buarque de Hollanda and Alan Douglas Poole. Sugarcane as an Energy Source in Brazil. INEE. pg.2 <www.inee.org.br/down_loads/forum/SUGARCANE&ENERGY.pdf>
[9] ANFAVEA (Associação Nacional dos Fabricantes de Veículos Automotores) 2006. Data from www.anfavea.com.br.
[10] Jaime Buarque de Hollanda and Alan Douglas Poole. Op. cit.. Pg.4.
[11] J. R. Moreira and J.Goldemberg. Op.cit. Pg 229.
[12] Unica (União da Agroindústria Canavieira de São Paulo), 2002. Data from www.unica.com.br.
[13] Plínio M. Nastari.. “Informativo Datagro” Report on the cane, sugar and alcohol industry, São Paulo, Brazil, 2005, Numbers 1. Pg.12
[14] Goldemberg, José, Suani Teixeira Coelho, Plinio Mário Nastari, and Oswaldo Lucon. 2004. “Ethanol Learning Curve—the Brazilian Experience.” Biomass & Bioenergy 26: 301–304.
[15] Worldwatch Institute. Biofuels for Transportation: Global Potential and Implications for Sustainable Energy in the 21st Century. May 4, 2006.
[m1]Updated.

Por Margareth Tse


Avaliação independente sobre o relatório elaborado pelo Painel Intergovernamental Sobre Mudança Climática (IPCC) refuta alegações alarmistas que foram publicadas no “Resumo aos elaboradores de políticas públicas”- Fevereiro de 2007


Londres — Uma análise independente sobre a ciência em mudança climática, em muitos aspectos, contradiz o resumo oficial voltado aos elaboradores de políticas públicas, divulgado em 02 de fevereiro de 2007, em Paris, e que coloca em dúvida as alegações feitas pelas Organizações das Nações Unidas (ONU).

O novo relatório foi produzido pelo renomado Instituto Fraser, um membro da Coalizão da Sociedade Civil em Mudança Climática e foi escrito por um painel de dez reconhecidos profissionais internacionais. O documento trata de uma análise da minuta da primeira seção do relatório que está por vir, produzido pelo Painel Intergovernamental Sobre Mudança Climática (IPCC).

“O debate em torno da mudança climática se tornou altamente politizado e alarmista. Então decidimos solicitar a um time de cientistas altamente qualificados para ler o relatório do IPCC e criar um resumo em que eles sintam que estão transmitindo o real estado de conhecimento. Nossa intenção com este documento é permitir que as pessoas vejam por elas mesmas o que é conhecido e o que permanece como incertezas dentro da ciência da mudança climática.” comentou o Dr. Ross McKitrick, coordenador do documento.

O “Resumo Independente aos elaboradores de políticas públicas” conclui o seguinte:

- Baseada nas mais acuradas medidas disponíveis – satélites de tempo – existe pouca evidência de aquecimento atmosférico desde 1979 (quando os registros de satélite iniciaram).

- Não existe evidência convincente de que mudanças perigosas ou sem precedentes no clima estejam em curso.

- Não há padrão global consistente em termos de tendências de precipitação de longo prazo, áreas cobertas por neve ou profundidade da neve.

- Dados atuais sugerem um significativo aumento global do nível de mar de 2 a 3 milímetros por ano.

- A mudança climática observada não pode ser atribuída a uma causa específica, como o aumento das concentrações de gases-estufa atmosféricos. Estudos de atribuição dependem de simulações de computador e não levam em conta a incerteza inerente dos modelos climáticos, nem levam em conta adequadamente outras importantes influências potenciais como aerossóis, atividade solar e mudanças pelo uso da terra.

“Não existe evidência fornecida no relatório do IPCC de que a incerteza em mudança climática possa ser formalmente solucionada por princípios iniciais, testes estatísticos hipotéticos e exercício de modelos,” diz McKitrick. “O que isto significa para o leigo? Significa que enquanto a evidência científica mostra as variações naturais do clima, nós ainda não sabemos a extensão em que a humanidade está contribuindo para a mudança climática no futuro e se tal mudança é boa ou má. As pessoas que estão confusas pelo intenso alarmismo sobre aquecimento global dos últimos anos deveriam ler o relatório independente para ter um entendimento mais equilibrado e acurado do real estado de conhecimento neste importante assunto.”Julian Morris, director executivo do International Policy Network, diz que este relatório é de suma importância pois traz o necessário realismo para o debate em mudança climática, que está dominado pelo alarmismo.

Para obter uma cópia do Resumo Independente do Instituto Fraser, visite o website: http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/shared/readmore.asp?sNav=pb&id=886

Ou no próprio website do Instituto Liberdade: http://www.il-rs.org.br/ na Seção Mudança Climática

Organização e Coordenação global pela Property Rights Alliance (PRA) e International Policy Network (IPN)

Entidade Responsável pela divulgação do IIDP no Brasil: Instituto Liberdade

Porto Alegre, 06 de março de 2007 - O Índice de Direitos de Propriedade 2007 - IIDP (International Property Rights Index - IPRI) é o primeiro estudo comparativo internacional que mede a importância dos direitos de propriedade tanto física como intelectual e sua proteção em direção ao bem-estar econômico. O Índice foi criado pelo Programa de Bolsas de Estudo Hernando de Soto da Property Rights Alliance (PRA), em Washington, DC, EUA, e distribuído em 38 organizações de 6 continentes incluindo o INSTITUTO LIBERDADE, no Brasil.

O Índice avalia três areas, Ambiente Legal e Político (LP), Direitos de Propriedade Físicos (PPR) e os Direitos de Propriedade Intelectual (IPR). Os resultados dificilmente surpreendem: os países classificados no topo do quartil usufruem um PIB médio sete vezes maior que os países do quartil inferior. Trata-se de um medidor internacional em direitos de propriedade privada de 70 países, que representam mais do que 95% do PIB mundial.

Dentro do espírito do trabalho de ponta conduzido por Soto, a esperança é a de que o Índice prepare o caminho para estudos futuros, que classificarão os países de acordo com as forças e fraquezas de seus direitos de propriedade, assim como apoiar os formuladores de políticas públicas na composição de uma legislação sólida, que fortaleça a proteção da propriedade e o estado de direito.

Outro objetivo do Índice é de auxiliar os países na identificação de falhas das políticas atuais de direitos de propriedade e na estrutura legal.

Os mecanismos legais essenciais, que estão ao alcance de empreendedores em países avançados, são exatamente o que os desprovidos necessitam para transacionarem além do seu círculo familiar e social, diz o importante economista Hernando de Soto em sua introdução.

De acordo com a Dra. Margaret Tse, do Instituto Liberdade, em relação ao Brasil, as distorções de mercado - incluindo impostos e tarifas - são a norma. Estes agem como barreiras ao empreendorismo. Da mesma forma, a ausência de definições do arcabouço jurídico e do estado de direito, com referência à proteção dos direitos de propriedade, impedem investimentos em pesquisa, tecnologia e capital humano. Ela ainda acrescenta o grave impacto da interferência governamental, pois os entes públicos brasileiros dispõem hoje de um poder ilimitado para, arbitrariamente, despojar qualquer cidadão ou entes particulares de seus bens ao invocar a "função social”. É uma visão anticapitalista, antiempresarial e antiindivíduo. Superar o poder de interesses políticos entrincheirados e estabelecer uma política pública racional hoje em dia vai exigir o mesmo tipo de comprometimento para com os direitos de propriedade.

A rede de organizações internacionais parceiras na divulgação do lançamento do IPRI 2007 é composta pelas seguintes entidades:

1. Alternate Solutions Institute, Pakistan
2. Asociación de Consumidores Libres, Costa Rica

3. Centre for Free Enterprise, Korea
4. Centro de Investigaciones Económicas Nacionales, Guatemala

5. CEPOS, Denmark

6. Competere, Italy

7. Circulo Liberal, Uruguay

8. CIVITA, Norway

9. ESEADE University, Argentina

10. Eudoxa, Sweden

11. European Center for Economic Growth, Austria

12. FREE, Poland

13. Friedrich A. v. Hayek Institut, Austria

14. Friedrich Naumann Foundation, East and Southeast Asia Regional Office

15. Fundación Atlas 1853, Argentina

16. Fundación IDEA, Mexico

17. Fundación Libertad, Panama

18. Fundación Libertad y Democracia, Bolivia

19. IMANI: The Centre for Humane Education, Ghana

20. Initiative for Public Policy Analysis, Nigeria
21. Instituto de Libre Empresa, Peru
22. Instituto Ecuatoriano de Economía Política, Ecuador
23. Instituto Liberdade, Brazil
24. Instituto Libertad y Progreso, Colombia
25. Instituto Para La Libertad y el Analisis de Politicas, Costa Rica
26. Institut Constant de Rebecque, Switzerland
27. Institute for Free Enterprise, Germany
28. Institute for Public Affairs, Australia
29. Inter Region Economic Network, Kenya
30. International Policy Network, United Kingdom
31. Jerusalem Institute for Market Studies, Israel
32. Libertad y Desarrollo, Chile

33. Liberty Institute, India

34. Property Rights Alliance, United States

35. RSE - Centre for Social and Economic Research, Iceland

36. The Center for Institutional Analysis and Development, Romania

37. The Free Market Foundation, South Africa

38. The Lion Rock Institute, Hong Kong

Os dados completos, incluindo as exposições publicadas, os links de cada componente do relatório, as páginas com informações de cada país em um total de 70 países, os links da rede de 38 organizações internacionais parceiras na divulgação do índice estão disponibilizados no website: www.InternationalPropertyRightsIndex.org

O Instituto Liberdade, faz parte desta rede parceira internacional e é responsável pela divulgação do índice no Brasil. Para quem estiver interessado em receber a publicação original em inglês impressa, o Instituto Liberdade disponibiliza o material. Entre em contato com o instituto pelo e-mail: il-rs@il-rs.org.br

O website do Instituto Liberdade também apresenta uma seção dedicada ao Índice Internacional de Direitos de Propriedade (IIDP): www.il-rs.org.br

O INSTITUTO LIBERDADE DO RS anuncia a Coalizão da Sociedade Civil em Mudança Climática

O Instituto Liberdade participa junto com mais 25 organizações na formação de uma coalizão global sobre a mudança climática, para desafiar o alarmismo não justificável e promover debates racionais. Quem coordena o grupo é a entidade International Policy Network de Londres.

Devido à divulgação do relatório alarmista elaborado pelo Painel Intergovernamental de Mudanças Climáticas (IPCC) em 02/02/07, um grupo de 26 organizações da sociedade civil, provenientes de 23 países, formaram uma nova coalizão global.

A Coalizão da Sociedade Civil em Mudança Climática procura oferecer uma visão mais racional sobre o assunto, baseada em avaliações independentes das evidências e das opções em políticas públicas.

A Coalizão da Sociedade Civil em Mudança Climática visa educar o público sobre as questões da mudança climática de uma maneira imparcial. Ela foi criada como uma resposta às muitas alegações catastróficas sobre o aquecimento global ser uma conseqüência direta e inequívoca da ação do homem, que por sua vez servem como justificativas para o avanço da agenda política da burocracia global.

Os membros da coalizão compartilham do mesmo comprometimento em aperfeiçoar o entendimento do público sobre uma gama de questões em políticas públicas. Todos os membros são organizações sem fins lucrativos, independentes e não subordinados a partidos políticos e governos.

“Correntes do pensamento científico atestam que não existe evidência científica convincente de que o lançamento humano de dióxido de carbono, metano e outros gases de estufa causem ou irão causar num futuro próximo o aquecimento da atmosfera da terra e tumultuar o clima do planeta”, comenta Margaret Tse, Vice Presidente Executiva do Instituto Liberdade, think-tank brasileiro. “As credenciais dos cientistas e as qualificações de institutos e empresas independentes como o Oregon Institute of Science and Medicine, o Scripps Institution of Oceanography, o Science and Environmental Policy Project e da MetSul Meteorologia dão credibilidade e autenticidade ao fato de que a humanidade não tem uma interferência tão importante quanto à elevação da temperatura no planeta”.

Acompanha esta mensagem o relatório da Fraser Institute do Canadá e algum material sobre o mito dos ambientalistas de esquerda e porque eles fazem estes sustos todas na população mundial!!!